

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY**

**NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE**

**BEYOND THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW**

**INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT**

**LT COL MARK A. GUNZINGER/CLASS OF '96**

**THESIS ADVISORS: COL FRED WIENERS  
DR. CHARLES STEVENSON**

**FACULTY ADVISOR: COL FRED WIENERS**

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>1996</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Beyond The Bottom-Up Review Individual Research Project</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>NDU-INSS Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319-5066</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>UU</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>51</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

## INTRODUCTION

On 1 September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin publicly announced the results of the DoD Bottom-Up Review (BUR), declaring it was “a product of a comprehensive, broadly collaborative review based on the real dangers that face America in this new time.”<sup>1</sup> Secretary Aspin’s announcement capped the nation’s second effort to determine a defense structure sized and shaped for a post-Cold War world. This essay examines the 1993 BUR, its intent, key assumptions, and the ability of the resulting force structure to support the objectives of the Administration’s *National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement*. *Joint Publication 1-02* defines “national security strategy” as “the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.”<sup>2</sup> The art and science of defense planning is an imperfect, iterative process, especially in a time of transition and uncertainty. This essay concludes the BUR was based on a number of assumptions that may need to be revisited in order to resolve the emerging shortfalls in U.S. defense capabilities. Doing so will require another defense review, one that builds on the lessons learned from the Bottom-Up Review to ensure the Armed Forces remain prepared to meet the dangers and challenges of the future, in peace and in war.

## BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS

*“U S military forces must be sized and shaped to deal with the threats of a new security environment, not the old threat which drove our military planning for the last 40 years ”      Les Aspin, January 1992<sup>3</sup>*

### A new paradigm or “less of the same”?

The foundations of the BUR were developed during the 1991-92 Congressional debates over the Bush Administration’s Base Force (Attachment 1). During the debates, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin emerged as one of the more vocal opponents for additional force cuts and a larger peace dividend. In essence, Aspin declared the Administration had failed to

take a bottom-up approach to devising a defense structure for the new security environment. From January to June 1992, Chairman Aspin produced a series of papers proposing an alternative force to meet emerging and enduring threats.<sup>4</sup> In a 6 January presentation to the Atlantic Council, Aspin explained the first step to building a post-Cold War defense structure was to define the changing security environment and vital interests Americans would be willing to use force to protect (Table 1, Attachment 2). Aspin followed with a 24 January white paper that declared a fundamental task of force planners was to “identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them,” including countering regional aggressors, combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), fighting terrorism, restricting drug trafficking, keeping the peace and assisting civilians.<sup>5</sup> One month later, Chairman Aspin published four options for a post-Cold War force that were the product of a threat-based methodology. Aspin believed this methodology was especially important in a tight fiscal environment, since “our citizens understandably will be reluctant to pay for defense unless there is a clear linkage between the forces and the threats those forces are designed to deal with.”<sup>6</sup> The paper reiterated situations for which Americans might want to employ military forces and advocated linking the gross size of the force to the need to counter regional aggressors. Aspin argued requirements for other missions, such as combating the spread of WMD, counterterrorism, restricting drug trafficking, helping civilians, and keeping the peace, were lesser-included cases that would not affect the size of the force significantly.

On 25 February, Aspin presented his four options to the House Budget Committee (Figure 1, Attachment 2). Option A provided the capability to win one major regional conflict (MRC) and pursue a lesser peacetime operation simultaneously. Option B added fast sealift, afloat prepositioning and a Desert Storm Equivalent of air forces, allowing participation in a conventional conflict “in Korea or Europe or elsewhere where our allies have major ground forces at the same

time as we ran a full Desert Storm in some part of the world like the Persian Gulf where our allies lacked adequate ground forces.”<sup>7</sup> Option C provided more forces for a rotation base to sustain a Desert Storm operation and added a package capable of an operation the size of Just Cause, while Option D added capability for a second Provide-Comfort operation. Options B through D were based on a strategy of winning one MRC decisively while using airpower to assist coalition partners to stop an aggressor in a second MRC until forces from the first conflict could redeploy. This would later become known as a “win-hold-win” strategy during the Bottom-Up Review.<sup>8</sup> In a follow-up letter to House Budget Committee Chairman Leon E. Panetta, Aspin advocated Option C for a savings of \$12-15 billion for FY93 and \$91 billion over the FYDP baseline budget, \$41 billion more savings than the latest Bush proposal.<sup>9</sup> While Congress eventually approved a FY93 budget that was only about \$3 billion less than requested by the President, sentiment was growing that perhaps Aspin was right when he said “It’s time to start from scratch. It’s time to build defense budgets for a brand new era. And that is not what we’re seeing coming out of the Pentagon so far.”<sup>10</sup>

#### Key Aspin themes and assumptions

While Aspin’s white papers did not lead to a significant change in defense spending during the FY93 budget cycle, a number of his key themes were to have a greater impact one year later. First, Aspin asserted **a new defense review was needed** since the Base Force was based on one, and not the two revolutions in the international environment that had occurred since 1989. According to Aspin, the first revolution ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, while the second was marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991. The Base Force preserved military capability to deal with a resurrected Soviet Union, an event Aspin no longer believed was likely.<sup>11</sup> Instead, Aspin claimed the demise of the Soviet Union meant “the old basis for sizing and shaping our defenses is simply gone.”<sup>12</sup>

Second, Aspin believed **the next force “must be created from the bottom up, not just by subtracting some amount from the old Cold War structure”** Creating a force from the bottom-up entailed defining the future environment, developing a coherent security strategy, and determining what military tasks and forces were needed to secure the nation’s interests. Aspin believed the Bush Administration had engaged in a top-down “salami slicing” effort to realize predetermined fiscal objectives, producing a Base Force that was a smaller version of an outdated Cold War force.<sup>13</sup>

Third, to be acceptable to Congress and the American people, **a post-Cold War force must be threat-based.** In his 6 January white paper, Aspin declared “there is no alternative to a threat-based force structure, that is, one that is sized and shaped to cope with the ‘things’ that threaten Americans . . . thus, it is critical to identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them.”<sup>14</sup> Aspin rejected capabilities-based planning methodologies advocated by General Colin Powell during the Base Force defense review, in part because they tend to preserve more forces as a hedge against uncertainty.

Fourth, Aspin assumed **the size of a post-Cold war force would be driven by the requirements to counter regional aggressors.** Requirements for lesser contingencies would help shape, but not significantly increase, the size of the force.

Fifth, Aspin believed the DoD should consider the lessons of Desert Storm as it planned for the future, especially the idea that **force enhancements, including the procurement of high-tech weapons and adequate support, would allow a smaller force to accomplish the same mission.** Aspin embraced the widespread belief that high-tech weapons were the key to the Coalition’s resounding victory and low casualty rate, as were mobility, logistics, intelligence, and other support forces. Aspin pointed out the relatively small portion of the U.S. combat capability deployed to the desert required a much larger fraction of the total U.S. support capability. Building-in sufficient

support from the start would yield “a force structure that could deal with multiple simultaneous contingencies. This is why the forces portrayed below, while smaller than the Cheney force structure, would be able to conduct the multiple contingency operations required of them.”<sup>15</sup>

**Table 2: Aspin’s Alternative Force Options, February 1992**

	Force A	Force B	Force C	Force D	Base Force	End FY91
<b>ARMY</b>						
Active Divisions	8	8	9	10	12	16
Reserve Divisions	2	2	6	6	6	10
Cadre Divisions	0	0	0	2	2	0
<b>MARINE CORPS</b>						
Active Divisions	2	2	2	3	2 1/3	3
Reserve Divisions	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>AIR FORCE</b>						
Active Fighter Wings	6	8	10	11	15	22
Reserve Fighter Wings	4	6	8	9	11	12
<b>NAVY</b>						
Total Ships	220	290	340	430	450	528
Carriers	6	8	12	15	13	15
SSNs	20	40	40	50	80	87
Assault Ships	50	50	50	82	50	65
<b>SEALIFT</b>						
Fast Sealift	16	24	24	24	8	8
Afloat Prepositioning ships (beyond MPS)	20	24	24	24	8	8
<b>PERSONNEL (x1000)</b>						
Active	1,247	1,312	1,409	1,575	1,626	
Reserve Components	666	691	904	933	920	

Finally, the Nation was due a larger peace dividend to meet pressing domestic needs following the end of the Cold War. While reform in the Soviet Union remained uncertain and Americans were deploying to the Gulf, Congress had little desire to challenge the Administration’s defense budget. However, 1992 was an election year, the Soviet empire had disintegrated, and pressure for defense cuts was again building <sup>16</sup>

These key themes and assumptions help explain the underpinnings of Aspin’s methodology as well as why he “assigned himself the task of developing an alternative defense budget that can win backing of congressional Democrats and perhaps the party’s presidential candidates”<sup>17</sup> While his proposals helped shape Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities needed for a post-Cold War world, they had an even greater impact on the latter audience, especially President-elect Bill Clinton, who nominated Aspin to become his first Secretary of Defense

## THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

### The mandate

During his Senate confirmation hearings on 7 January 1993, Secretary of Defense nominee Aspin was asked if he could maintain a "Force C position" and realize the \$60 billion in additional defense cuts proposed by President-elect Clinton during the campaign. Aspin replied, "You can make the \$60 billion cut off the Bush baseline, and do option C, that I'm sure of"<sup>18</sup>. The Senate quickly confirmed Aspin, giving him the opportunity to realize this goal. Within weeks, Aspin had initiated a national security strategy and force structure Bottom-Up Review, assigning responsibility for directing the review to Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner. A 23 February 1993 Wisner memorandum to Aspin clarified the review's mandate:

The main objective of the Bottom-Up Review is to develop guidelines for reducing and restructuring the U S defense posture in the context of a revised U S military strategy. This in turn will give you presentational material and analytical backup that you can use to persuade various audiences to support the Clinton-Aspin defense program.<sup>19</sup>

Wisner confirmed the overall intent of the BUR was to identify post-Cold War threats, opportunities, security objectives, and develop a coherent strategy and force structure to achieve those objectives. Wisner also informed Aspin the BUR would capitalize on his previous work by following "the same construct you used with the Democratic Caucus last year"<sup>20</sup>.

Secretary Wisner divided the BUR into four broad functional areas. Area one would identify national objectives, threats, and opportunities for the post-Cold War era. Area two would define a coherent military strategy and baseline force structures realize these objectives. The product of the first two areas would constitute the DoD input to a National Security Council (NSC) document titled *National Security Strategy and the Role of U S Military Forces in the Post-Cold War Era* and provide the baseline for force development. Area three would evaluate modernization and resource issues, options, and costing baselines, while area four would assess the overall balance between



forces and modernization. Area four would also “assess a range of force packages in terms of their ability to secure U.S. operational objectives in single and concurrent major regional contingencies (Southwest Asia and Korea)” as well as the need for additional forces to accomplish forward presence and lesser contingencies, such as peacekeeping.<sup>21</sup> The review was to be completed in time to publish a *Defense Planning Guidance* document in July, which would guide the services’ efforts to revise their FY94-99 budget submissions

### Building the strategic foundation

Over the next month, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements Ted Warner and his two key assistants David Ochmanek (Strategy) and Dale Vesser (Requirements and Plans) led the effort to develop the OSD input to the Administration’s new national security strategy. Completed on 21 April, the OSD draft established regional instability, WMD, transnational dangers (disease, refugee flows, drug trafficking, and international crime) and dangers to democracy and reform as the four main threats of the post-Cold War international environment, as postulated by candidate Clinton in 1992. OSD proposed a “strategy of engagement” to ensure the U S would maintain its influence overseas and help create “new mechanisms for international order and to shape the international environment in ways needed to protect U S. objectives over the long term.”<sup>22</sup> The strategy’s centerpiece was a “a comprehensive effort to strengthen and broaden the coalition of democracies,” reflecting the Administration’s belief that democracies that share objectives and respect individual rights adopt policies that avoid the use of force against other democracies.<sup>23</sup> OSD also proposed redirecting resources towards the domestic agenda by finding “that balance whereby our security leadership is sustained at a lower cost that permits wise investment of our own resources in our own future.”<sup>24</sup> The strategy concluded by offering a range of military strategies and capabilities to secure U.S. interests (Table 3, Attachment 2).<sup>25</sup> To deal with the strategy’s

postulated dangers, OSD advocated U.S. forces must be capable of responding rapidly, fighting on arrival, and be sustainable. Another imperative was to avoid a “hollow” force, which would require “intense training, high readiness, highly qualified and motivated personnel, strategic mobility, and sufficient support and sustainment capabilities” as well as sufficient research and development to retain the nation’s technological superiority to meet the changing threats of the future.<sup>26</sup>

#### Force packages to meet new dangers

Throughout the rest of April and May, the Joint Staff, OSD, and the services developed force options to meet the requirements of the draft strategy. Notional building blocks included forces for MRCs, land-based overseas presence/crisis response, lesser regional contingencies and “new world focus” missions such as promoting democracy, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian operations and disaster relief. On 8 May 1993 the Joint Staff briefed Secretary Aspin on their progress to date. Two points from this “Force for 2000” briefing are pertinent to this essay. First, the Joint Staff had developed three MRC options:

**Table 4: “Force for 2000” MRC Force Options<sup>27</sup>**

<u>Win 1 MRC</u>	<u>Win 1 MRC with Hold in 2nd</u>	<u>Win in 2 Nearly Simultaneous MRCs</u>
• 8 AC and 6 RC Divisions	• 10 AC and 6 RC Divisions	• 12 AC and 8 RC Divisions
• 8 CVBGs	• 10 CVBGs	• 12 CVBGs
• 5 MEBs and 1 RC USMC Div/Wing/FSSG	• 5 MEBs and 1 RC USMC Div/Wing/FSSG	• 5 MEBs and 1 RC USMC Div/Wing/FSSG
• 10 AC & 6 RC Fighter Wgs	• 13 AC & 7 RC Fighter Wgs	• 14 AC & 10 RC Fighter Wgs

Second, the briefing indicated forces sized for MRCs would also meet the requirements for lesser contingencies. The next step was to evaluate these options against potential threats. On 15 May, the Joint Staff delivered a briefing titled “Major Regional Contingency Warfighting Assessment” to Secretary Aspin. The briefing concluded the second and third “Force for 2000” MRC options were adequate for fighting two regional conflicts, depending on the desired strategy.<sup>28</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Ochmanek presented a separate briefing titled “Fighting and

Winning Future Major Regional Conflicts” that highlighted the critical role of advanced munitions in slowing or stopping an invading enemy force early in a conflict, allowing time for follow-on forces to deploy. Ochmanek’s briefing further reinforced Aspin’s faith in the value of advanced weaponry and helped shape the final forces and warfighting concepts recommended by the BUR.

#### Making the MRC decision

During a 16 June 1993 speech at the National Defense University, Secretary Aspin reviewed the status of the BUR and outlined the campaign planning principles for fighting a regional conflict. According to Aspin, the first task for American forces deploying to a MRC was to “stop the enemy’s invading army as quickly as possible.”<sup>29</sup> This would help preserve access to critical ports and airfields, decrease the chance that an ally would surrender before U S forces could deploy, and minimize territory lost to invading forces. The buildup of combat power would continue during phase two, the precursor to phase three, operations to eject and decisively defeat the enemy. Aspin believed stopping enemy attacks quickly was “the critical element in dealing with multiple contingencies in an era when, first, we don’t know where the next conflict will come and second, we won’t have sufficient forces on the ground to meet it when it does.”<sup>30</sup> Aspin went on to explain that airlift, prepositioning, advanced munitions, and battlefield surveillance were the key to this operational strategy. As a result, the BUR was taking a close look at these capabilities, especially advanced munitions such as air-dispersed wide area mines, all-weather, anti-tank Sensor Fused Weapons and surface-to-surface missiles that dispensed Brilliant Anti-tank Submunitions.<sup>31</sup> While the speech helped clarify the emerging BUR warfighting strategy, some who heard it believed Aspin had also confirmed another, more controversial change in policy.

On 17 June, *The Washington Post* reported the details of Aspin’s speech in a front-page article titled “U.S. May Drop 2-War Capability.” As the title indicates, the article focused on the “win-

hold-win" MRC option Aspin had mentioned during the speech. While Aspin's aides responded this had been a "trial balloon" and not a final position, a media firestorm quickly developed over what was believed to be a major shift away from the Bush Administration's two-MRC strategy<sup>32</sup> Nor were the negative comments limited to the press. As the *Post* reported, officers from all the services had criticized this option as risky, since the course of reform in the former Soviet Union was still uncertain. In fact, some senior officers had gone so far as to label the strategy "win-hold-lose." Even more telling were criticisms coming from U.S. security partners, especially South Korea. According to one anonymous military source, the South Korean government was very concerned because "basically it means we give up Seoul and then come back and clean it up later."<sup>33</sup>

The criticism had a significant impact on the final BUR MRC option. During a speech at Andrews Air Force Base on 25 June, Secretary Aspin declared "After much discussion and analysis, we've come to the conclusion that our forces must be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts, and nearly-simultaneously."<sup>34</sup> Aspin explained this would help deter a potential second aggressor from taking advantage of a U.S. already engaged in a regional conflict, as well as provide a hedge against future threats. With this decision behind them, OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services spent the next two months resolving remaining issues and assessing the BUR's budgetary impact.

BUR recommendations

On 1 September 1993, Secretary Aspin released the results of the Bottom-Up Review. The first section of his final report essentially repeated the "strategy of engagement, prevention and partnership" that OSD had submitted to the NSC. The report also explained the BUR's methodology, including the use of scenarios as tools for developing a two-MRC force structure. MRC warfighting phases remained the same as Aspin described at NDU, including the need to stop an enemy invasion quickly. Fighting and winning a *single* MRC would require four to five Army

divisions, four to five Marine Expeditionary Brigades, ten Air Force fighter wings, 100 deployable heavy bombers, four-to five CVBGs, and special operations forces<sup>35</sup> The report outlined four MRC strategies and force options, recommending the third as “the best choice to execute our defense strategy and maintain the flexibility needed to deal with the wide range of dangers we may face.”

**Table 5: Bottom-Up Review MRC Force Options**

	1	2	3	4
Strategy	Win One MRC	Win One MRC with Hold in Second	Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs	Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs Plus Conduct Smaller Operation
Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 Active Divisions</li> <li>• 6 Reserve Division Equivalents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 Active Divisions</li> <li>• 6 Reserve Division Equivalents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 Active Divisions</li> <li>• 15 Reserve Enhanced-Readiness Brigades</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12 Active Divisions</li> <li>• 8 Reserve Enhanced Equivalents</li> </ul>
Navy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 Carrier Battle Groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 Carrier Battle Groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 11 Carrier Battle Groups</li> <li>• 1 Reserve Carrier</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12 Carrier Battle Groups</li> </ul>
Marine Corps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 Active Brigades</li> <li>• 1 Reserve Division</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 Active Brigades</li> <li>• 1 Reserve Division</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 Active Brigades</li> <li>• 1 Reserve Division</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 Active Brigades</li> <li>• 1 Reserve Division</li> </ul>
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 Active Fighter Wings</li> <li>• 6 Reserve Fighter Wings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 13 Active Fighter Wings</li> <li>• 7 Reserve Fighter Wings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 13 Active Fighter Wings</li> <li>• 7 Reserve Fighter Wings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 14 Active Fighter Wings</li> <li>• 10 Reserve Fighter Wings</li> </ul>
			Force Enhancements	

If the U S committed to fighting two MRCs, option three would leave “little other active force structure to provide other overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or other low-intensity operation ” Furthermore, selected high-leverage assets would have to redeploy from the first MRC to the second, including part of the bomber force. Option three’s “force enhancements” alluded to the need to improve strategic mobility, increase the strike potential of Navy carrier airwings, enhance the lethality of Army firepower by procuring advanced munitions and weapon systems that can be employed early in a conflict, modifying Air Force bombers to carry advanced conventional munitions, and improving the readiness and flexibility of reserve component forces<sup>36</sup> While option four added forces for lesser missions, the BUR report rejected it because it would “require significant additional resources, thereby eliminating any ‘peace dividend’ the American people are expecting as a result of the end of the Cold War.”<sup>37</sup>

The BUR report also addressed force building blocks for other missions, including peace enforcement, intervention operations and overseas presence. Forces required for “peace enforcement and intervention” contingencies could “largely be provided by the same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs, so long as the forces had the appropriate training needed for peacekeeping or peace enforcement.”<sup>38</sup> The BUR recommended maintaining about 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 in Northeast Asia for overseas presence. While the BUR reviewed nuclear deterrence requirements, Aspin deferred major changes in lieu of a comprehensive follow-on Nuclear Posture Review. Added together, the force structure required to fulfill the nation’s security requirements resembled a smaller version of the Base Force (Table 5, Attachment 2).

#### Projected savings

The last section of the report estimated the BUR would save \$91 billion over the 1995-99 FYDP compared to the Bush baseline. Since “the Clinton Administration defense budget target for this same period was \$1,221 billion,” a difference of \$104 billion from the baseline, an additional \$13 billion cut would be spread across the first four years of the FYDP (Table 6, Attachment 2). Therefore, in addition to determining “what constituted the best defense strategy and policy for America,” the BUR also fulfilled the President’s campaign promise to cut the defense budget.<sup>39</sup>

#### Implementing the BUR

Shortly after releasing the BUR report, Secretary Aspin issued his first *Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)* document to codify its recommendations. Along with force cuts and specific weapons systems guidance, the *DPG* established readiness and sustainability as the top priority for resources, followed by force structure, high leverage science and technology programs, systems acquisition, and infrastructure and overhead.<sup>40</sup> The *DPG* hedged in several areas, including nuclear forces, pending the outcome of follow-on studies. In September 1994 the President approved the

recommendations of the *Nuclear Posture Review*, which established a baseline nuclear deterrent force of 14 SSBNs equipped with D-5 missiles, 450-500 single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs, 20 B-2s, and 66 B-52Hs. Another follow-on analysis titled the *Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS-BURU)* examined mobility forces required to support two nearly-simultaneous MRCs. Completed 28 March 1995, the *MRS-BURU* affirmed the BUR's conclusions that increased airlift, sealift, and prepositioning were required for two nearly-simultaneous MRCs. On 7 February, 1994, the President released his first complete budget implementing the BUR

**Table 7: FY1995 National Defense Budget Authority (Current \$ Billions)<sup>41</sup>**

	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
<b>DoD Military</b>	249 0	252 2	243 4	240 2	246 7	253 0
<b>DoE &amp; Other</b>	11 9	11 5	11 9	11 8	12 0	12 1
<b>Total National Defense</b>	<u>260 9</u>	<u>263 7</u>	<u>255 3</u>	<u>252 0</u>	<u>258 7</u>	<u>265 1</u>
<b>% Real Change</b>	<b>-9.0</b>	<b>-0.9</b>	<b>-5.9</b>	<b>-4.0</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>-0.3</b>

The DoD news release announcing the budget noted “in real terms the FY 1995 budget is 35 percent below FY 1985” marking the “tenth straight year of real decline for the defense budget”<sup>42</sup>

While the BUR's findings quickly became programming and budgeting policy, the new national security strategy did not receive the President's approval until July 1994. Titled *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, the strategy maintained the same fundamental underpinnings as the OSD draft submitted to the NSC one year earlier<sup>43</sup>

- To credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight
- To bolster America's economic revitalization
- To promote democracy abroad

Typical military missions included fighting and winning major regional contingencies, maintaining a credible overseas presence, counter-terrorism, fighting drug trafficking, combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and a wide range of peace operations. The strategy stressed economic revitalization at home would maintain America's prosperity, competitiveness in the global marketplace, and the ability to sustain a military befitting the world's only remaining superpower.

Finally, the strategy declared that promoting democracy abroad would serve all of America's global interests by helping to create an international environment with fewer conflicts, expanding free market economies, and greater respect for human rights

Following the publication of the *NSS*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed a new *National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS)* in 1995. Subtitled *A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, the *NMS* is based on "guidance from the national security strategy articulated by the President and from the Bottom-Up Review conducted by the Secretary of Defense."<sup>44</sup> As Figure 2 illustrates, peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning wars are the three broad tasks U S military forces will perform to accomplish the two national military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression (Attachment 2). Since it is based on the *National Security Strategy* and the BUR, the new *NMS* incorporates the assumptions underlying both. Although the *NMS* acknowledges the increased need to perform peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention missions globally, it also states the nation's core military requirement is for a force that is capable of fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MRCs. Furthermore, the *NMS* maintains the DoD will continue to use scenario-based planning exercises and postulated threats to size and shape future forces. The *NMS* also follows the *DPG's* resource priorities, placing modernization after force readiness.<sup>45</sup>

Over the last three years, criticizing the BUR has become something of a cottage industry. Credible experts, including former Secretary of Defense Cheney, have declared the BUR's defense cuts precipitous and risky.<sup>46</sup> Others believe the review preserved *more* forces than required for the post-Cold War era, especially since the U S defense budget is greater than that of Russia, China, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Koreas, Iran, and Iraq combined.<sup>47</sup> As the services continue to



downsize, a closer look at the assumptions underlying the BUR and follow-on implementing policies may clarify if the nation is building the kind of military capabilities it will need in the future

### **A CLOSER LOOK AT THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW**

Assumption: Another defense review was required following the collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 convinced many in Congress, including Les Aspin, that the DoD should conduct a comprehensive review of America's security needs for a post-Cold War world. As the 1993 OSD draft strategy advocated, the nation needed to "take advantage of the opportunity presented by the collapse of communism to redirect some resources toward our pressing domestic agenda."<sup>48</sup> While another review may have been warranted, it did not result in a significant shift away from the security strategy or the major force elements developed previously. The Bush Administration had already moved away from a Cold War strategy of containment towards meeting regional dangers to U.S. security interests. The Clinton Administration's strategy maintained two MRCs as a basis for sizing the post-Cold War force, as well as the need for sustaining a credible overseas presence and the capability to perform a wide range of operations other than war. Furthermore, both strategies established promoting democracy as a fundamental objective, broadening the military's role in *shaping* the international environment through operations other than war. While the Clinton Administration eliminated reconstitution as pillar of its strategy, its emphasis on preserving the defense industrial base as a means of hedging against uncertainty essentially made this a difference of degree. Although the BUR recommended a significant decrease in the size of the force, it maintained the same major units (carriers, divisions, fighter wings . . . ) as the Base Force. Overall, there are more similarities than differences between the strategies underlying the two forces. Even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell remarked at the official unveiling of the BUR that "the strategy underpinning [it] is quite similar . . . because the world looks quite similar

to us whether you're wearing Base Force eyes or Bottom-Up Review eyes”<sup>49</sup>

Assumption: A post-Cold War force must be developed via a bottom-up methodology

The methodology developed by Chairman Aspin's staff in 1991 and 1992 linked national objectives and military tasks to required force structure. As Secretary Wisner explained, the intent was to apply the same methodology to the BUR, without the pressure of a specific savings target. In fact, the February 1994 news release of the FY1995 DoD budget declared “the Bottom-Up Review was undertaken without a precise defense spending target in mind.”<sup>50</sup> While the targets may not have been exact, there is little doubt the Joint Staff and the services understood the Administration had issued substantive savings guidelines.<sup>51</sup> Slightly less than one year earlier, the Clinton Administration had submitted its *first* budget proposal that cut \$88 billion in budget authority from the FY94-97 Bush baseline, announcing it “cuts Cold War forces and begins to buy the new capabilities we need to meet the new dangers we face.” Under the new budget, Air Force fighter wings would drop from 28 to 24, Army active component divisions would fall from 14 to 12, and the Navy battle force would drop to 413 ships and 12 carriers.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, both Clinton and Aspin had frequently mentioned savings targets prior to and during the review. These spending targets support assertions that the BUR was not *entirely* bottom-up, but was, in part, a top-down, fiscally-driven exercise to cut forces and realize a greater peace dividend.

Assumption: A post-Cold War force must be threat-based

Aspin believed the American people and Congress would not support a military force structure that failed to clearly link U.S. interests to the dangers that threatened them. As a result, Aspin's Option C and the BUR force were both developed using a mixed threat-based and scenario-based planning methodology. In fact, DoD has followed this approach to sizing and shaping military forces since the 1960s. RAND's corporate research manager for Defense and Technology Planning Paul K

Davis offers a succinct explanation of this enduring Cold War-era methodology

Having sized overall structure largely in terms of the most stressing threat, the original idea was to “fill in” by acquiring specialized capabilities that might be needed for other scenarios, and to establish a strategic reserve suitable for varied contingencies worldwide along with adequate strategic mobility forces (airlift, sealift, and prepositioning ships)<sup>53</sup>

Threat/scenario-based planning has its advantages and disadvantages. As Chairman Aspin wrote, it does link capabilities to threats in a way that can be understood by the American people. It also offers a systematic means of establishing priorities between national interests and regions, postulating conflict timelines, and defining military objectives. In the negative column, threat/scenario-based planning is reactive and biased towards quantitative data, making it difficult to capture qualitative factors such as enemy morale and training. Scenarios that center on Korea and Southwest Asia have a focus of about five to ten years in the future, a rather limited horizon for developing capabilities that will be in the field for the next twenty-plus years. Furthermore, defense analysts who employ threat/scenario-based methodologies may find it difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing international environment.<sup>54</sup> As a result, the methodology employed during the BUR may not be adequate for planning for the increased uncertainties of the post-Cold War world.

Dr. Clark Murdock, author of Aspin’s Option C, recently wrote that the case for scenario-based planning in an uncertain world is far from convincing. Murdock maintains the following unknowns predominate when thinking about the future security environment.

- What roles will the United States play?
- What are the threats?
- Who will have the capabilities and the will to challenge our interests?
- How much of the budget will be dedicated to defense?”<sup>55</sup>

There are alternative approaches for “planning for uncertainty.” Generally speaking, they begin with broad categories of military objectives, identify specific military tasks to achieve those objectives, and then determine the capabilities required to perform the tasks. Dr. Murdock advocates a

capabilities-based approach called “mission-pull ” Mission-pull first identifies future threat environments and the broad enemy capabilities within those environments, such as weapons of mass destruction. The next step is to define the missions, or operational objectives military forces must accomplish, and then break out the critical tasks within those missions. These broad capabilities could include deep strike, land combat, air combat, space operations, sea combat, information operations, missile defense, and so forth. The final step is to identify specific force requirements to perform the critical tasks. There are a number of advantages associated with a “mission-pull” methodology. First, it would encompass the capabilities needed to perform a broad array of missions, including operations other than war as well as actual combat. Second, it would help focus the planning efforts of the services on the future, and not just the near-term threat. Third, resources could be prioritized between the various capabilities and emerging technologies that may be needed to perform the missions. Furthermore, planners could identify a mix of forces that maximizes capability for different budget levels, versus traditional “requirements analysis” methods that seek the least-cost means to perform specific requirements. As Paul Davis indicates, requirements analysis “may yield a force mix that is ill-suited to other cases.”<sup>56</sup> The BUR analysis performed by the Joint Staff was, in many ways, a classic example of a requirements analysis that may not have produced a force mix suited to the mix of post-Cold War missions required by the *NMS*.

Assumption: MRC requirements should determine the size of the post-Cold War force

The *NMS* states “military forces exist -- are organized, trained, and equipped -- first and foremost to fight and win America’s wars.”<sup>57</sup> While fighting and winning America’s wars rightfully remains the DoD’s top priority, it does not necessarily follow that MRCs remain the most stressing case for sizing and shaping military forces in the post-Cold War era. During the latter years of the Cold War, forces sized to deter and defeat Communist aggression worldwide were generally

adequate for lesser contingencies and peacetime operations. However, sizing forces against warfighting scenarios may not meet the needs of a post-Cold War strategy founded on remaining engaged globally to shape the international environment, driving up peacetime operational tempos to near-unprecedented levels. As the *NMS* notes, "in the 5 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have deployed our forces to assist in security or humanitarian crises about 40 times -- a far greater pace than in the preceding 20 years."<sup>58</sup> Today, over 52,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed in support of thirteen operations world-wide, including Bosnia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Haiti, Cuba, Macedonia, and the Arabian Gulf. Over the past eight years, the Air Force has experienced nearly a three-fold increase in forces deployed overseas over the past eight years (Figure 3, Attachment 2). This mirrors the Army's pace of operations, which has increased by about 300 percent over the last four or five years. The Navy is similarly engaged, with an average of about 25 percent of its ships deployed for extended periods and another 25 percent underway conducting training or preparing to deploy.<sup>59</sup> While the impact of high operating tempos is situationally dependent, the end result can be units that are not readily available for higher priority missions, including combat operations.

In the event the nation commits to fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MRCs, most active component units engaged in overseas presence and lesser contingencies will have to redeploy to support combat operations. Redeployment times will depend on unit requirements to refurbish, rest, or regain their combat edge. High operating tempos increase wear and tear on equipment, deplete stores of expendables, and accelerate weapon system replacement schedules. Extended deployments can also affect unit morale and degrade combat skills. Combat skills are perishable, and troops engaged in peace operations may not be able to maintain their warfighting edge. The impact is especially severe on high-value, limited quantity intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, theater air defense, and support assets. Primitive infrastructures and limited access to adequate airfields and

ports in remote operating locations may also delay redeployments and further stress mobility forces.<sup>60</sup>

It is for these reasons that the Joint Staff's J-3 Readiness Division briefed the NSC that lesser regional contingencies exacerbate mobility and support force shortfalls, increase risk in the initial phase of an MRC, slow force closures for the counteroffensive, and may even prolong a conflict<sup>61</sup>

While a strategy that stresses global engagement and remaining capable of fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MRCs is appropriate for the world's only remaining superpower, it imposes costs that the BUR may not have accounted for fully. A capable, flexible, responsive post-Cold War force must be sized to perform the *full* range of peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention tasks required by the *NMS*, not just fight and win America's wars.

A post-Cold War force must also be *shaped* to perform peacetime missions, especially support forces that are in high demand. As the Reserve Forces Policy Board noted:

Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations place new demands on the Armed Forces. Peacekeeping operations typically require heavier concentrations of combat support and combat service support forces than combat operations. Emphasis is placed on medical, engineering, transportation, civil affairs, and command and control capabilities.<sup>62</sup>

The BUR maintained a large percentage of these units in the Army reserve component, assuming they would mobilize in time of war (Table 8, Attachment 2). While these units may be able to selectively support the active force engaged in operations other than war, high peacetime operating tempos and multiple simultaneous taskings will severely stress their capacity to do so. Shaping the force for the broad spectrum of tasks envisioned by the *NMS* might require transferring some of the support units currently in the reserves to the active component.

Enhancements and adequate support permit a smaller force to accomplish the same objectives

This was a fundamental assumption underlying Aspin's Option C and the final MRC option selected during the Bottom-Up Review. With three exceptions, the final option was the same as option two on the May 1993 "Force for 2000" MRC slide. First, the caption on the final option had

changed to "Win Two Nearly-Simultaneous MRCs" from "Win 1 MRC With Hold In Second" in the earlier briefing. Second, the final option contained twelve carriers instead of ten. The BUR report explained that while analysis had confirmed "a force of 10 carriers would be adequate to fight two nearly simultaneous MRCs," two additional carriers, one active and one training/reserve, were added for overseas presence.<sup>63</sup> Third, the BUR final report indicated the ability to win two nearly-simultaneous MRCs with the selected option *depended on key force enhancements*, including improving "(1) strategic mobility, through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift, (2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers, (3) the lethality of Army firepower, and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to deliver conventional smart munitions."<sup>64</sup> The BUR also recommended improving the readiness of Army National Guard combat units, especially the 15 brigades that would supplement active divisions in a second MRC. Since these enhancements constitute the critical difference between win-hold-win and winning two MRCs nearly-simultaneously, reviewing their status will help determine if the BUR force is capable of meeting the warfighting objectives of the *NMS*.

*Mobility.* Despite planned enhancements, the ability of the mobility force to deploy and sustain U.S. forces engaged in two nearly-simultaneous MRCs remains questionable. The *MRS-BURU* completed in 1995 reconfirmed mobility force enhancements are required to support a two nearly-simultaneous MRC strategy. Partially as a result of its findings, in November 1995 Secretary Perry approved the Air Force's plan to acquire 120 C-17 airlift aircraft. The backbone of the maritime leg of the mobility force will consist of 36 Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) cargo ships and 19 Large Medium Speed RO/ROs (LMSRs) when completed shortly after the turn of the century. Eight of the LMSRs are earmarked for afloat prepositioning. Increased overseas land-based prepositioning will also improve force closure times. According to the 1995 *National Military Strategy*, three additional

Army heavy brigade sets will be prepositioned ashore, complementing the brigade set prepositioned on ships.<sup>65</sup> While these mobility enhancements will improve the nation's ability to fight and win two nearly-simultaneous MRCs, most originated from the recommendations of the 1991 *Mobility Requirements Study*. A 1995 GAO report to Congress noted this study had

recommended the acquisition of additional C-17 aircraft and sealift ships and the prepositioning of Army equipment on ships. It stated that this recommendation *did not provide sufficient capability to handle a second conflict* [emphasis added]<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, the "Force for 2000" MRC slide stated "completion of C-17 buy and purchase of 20 large, medium speed RO-ROs required for all strategies," including the "Win 1 MRC With Hold In Second" option.<sup>67</sup> Finally, the *MRS-BURU* did not analyze lift requirements for a two MRC scenario that required redeploying units from ongoing lesser contingencies or swinging units from the first to the second conflict, both of which would further stress the mobility force. Perhaps it was for these reasons that Senator McCain recently wrote that "when the C-17 airlift aircraft and other air and sealift enhancement programs are completed early in the next decade, they will still not provide the full capacity necessary to quickly deploy the forces required to win a major regional conflict."<sup>68</sup>

*Strike capability of Navy carrier airwings* Current efforts to improve the striking power of the Navy's carriers include plans to fly additional aircraft to forward-deployed wings in the event of a conflict and procuring additional preferred munitions. The BUR also recommended procuring the F/A-18E/F strike fighter, which will have a slightly greater range and payload capability than the F/A-18C. F/A-18E/Fs will begin to enter the active inventory around the turn of the century, helping to offset the shortfall created by the BUR's early retirement of the A-6 strike fighter. The Navy will begin to take delivery of the Joint Strike Fighter with its next-generation stealth and weapon systems technologies around the year 2010. While these enhancements are needed, fiscal constraints have had an impact on the lethality of carrier airwings. To fully man its ten active airwings, the Navy



requires a total of thirty F/A-18 squadrons (three squadrons for a total of 36 F/A-18s in each wing) Only 26 Navy F/A-18 active component squadrons are funded, leaving a shortfall of four squadrons. The gap is partially met by the Marine Corps, which has integrated three of its F/A-18 squadrons into carrier airwings. While this arrangement may help meet peacetime operational requirements, the continuing F/A-18 shortfall would affect the warfighting capability of the Navy or the Marine Corps in a two-MRC scenario.

*Conventional strike capabilities of long-range bombers* With the post-Cold War shift away from forward basing, forces capable of striking directly from bases in the U.S., including bomber forces, are critical to responding to short-notice regional crises. Despite planned enhancements, the ability of the bomber force to effectively respond to two nearly-simultaneous MRCs is in doubt. The BUR recommended maintaining a force of up to 184 bombers, 100 of which would be capable of deploying to a single MRC. Ongoing conventional enhancements include modifications “to improve their ability to deliver ‘smart’ conventional munitions against attacking enemy forces and fixed targets.” The BUR approved Air Force plans to acquire all-weather munitions “to attack and destroy critical targets in the crucial opening days of a short-warning conflict.”<sup>69</sup> As a result, several munitions programs were accelerated and the total planned buys increased. However, as the Air Force’s 1992 *Bomber Roadmap* indicates, the majority of these enhancements were planned well in advance of the BUR.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, the BUR did not halt bomber force reductions or recommend procuring additional B-2s, instigating numerous calls to reevaluate the Air Force’s bomber programs. In May 1995, The Center For Security Policy unequivocally declared “the United States urgently requires a larger, more flexible and more stealthy manned bomber force than even the Bottom-Up Review envisioned, to say nothing of the far smaller force supported by the Clinton Administration’s budgets.”<sup>71</sup> This sentiment was echoed in a letter sent to House Appropriations Committee

Chairman Robert L. Livingston by Air Force General (retired) Charles A. Horner. General Horner, architect of the Gulf War air campaign, wrote "by any measure 20 B-2s are not enough . . . a force of 40 or more B-2s is a reasonable estimate."<sup>72</sup> Finally, the force of 100 deployable bombers for a single MRC recommended by the BUR required bombers to swing from one MRC to a second conflict should one occur. During his 16 April 1995 testimony to the House National Security Committee, Commander of the Air Force Air Combat Command General John M. Loh declared this operational concept untested and risky. General Loh followed by stating the nation needed about 180 *operational* bombers for two MRCs, excluding aircraft for backup inventory, attrition reserves, and flight test.<sup>73</sup> In other words, General Loh was saying DoD's plan to maintain a total of 181 bombers was insufficient for a two-MRC strategy.

*Modernization* In order to be able to execute a two nearly-simultaneous MRC strategy, the BUR recommended continuing a number of other weapon system modernization programs and procuring additional advanced munitions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, recent events indicate the defense budget proposed by the Administration may be under-funding service requirements. In March 1996, *The Washington Times* reported Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili informed Secretary Perry that "we risk future combat readiness of the U.S. military if we fail to adequately fund recapitalization, starting in 1997 . . . I urge you to set a procurement goal of about \$60 billion per year beginning in fiscal year 1998." The proposed FY97 budget contains only \$38.9 billion for defense procurement, a \$3.4 billion reduction from FY96. Procurement would increase to \$45.5 billion by 1998, but would not reach \$60 billion until the year 2001. In follow-up testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Shalikashvili remarked "I am very concerned that our procurement accounts are not where . . . I think they ought to be."<sup>74</sup> In a 13 March 1996 House National Security Committee hearing, each of the four service

chiefs echoed General Shalikashvili's assessment and recited a number of unfunded requirements. Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak bluntly stated "I think all of the chiefs believe \$60 billion is where we ought to be."<sup>75</sup> Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman told members of the committee "it's clear that in this budget we have a fiscally constrained modernization program." Asked if he had a "theoretical list" of programs they could use additional funding for, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer stated "we're short some 40,000 trucks -- in excess of 40,000 trucks." Replying to the same question, General Fogleman indicated the Air Force could immediately use over \$100 million for advanced munitions. But perhaps the most telling comment came from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda: "I don't have a hypothetical list, I've got a real list, of things that we've thought about, gotten approved, would fund if we had more money, but simply don't have enough."<sup>76</sup>

The Joint Chiefs' concerns are partially due to the resource priorities established by the BUR. While the BUR mandate was to shrink the post-Cold War force structure, Congress and the Clinton Administration were determined not to return to the "hollow force" of the 1970s. As a result, Secretary Aspin established readiness and sustainability as his top resource priorities, followed by force structure, high leverage science and technology programs, systems acquisition, and infrastructure and overhead. These priorities are reflected in the Administration's post-BUR budget. Compared to the Bush Administration's final budget plan, the Clinton Administration stressed operations and maintenance funding, which is directly related to short-term readiness. In 1994 the Congressional Research Service reported "almost all of the Clinton Administration's projected defense savings were due to (1) trimming pay raises and (2) paring weapons acquisition."

**Table 9: Differences Between Clinton and Bush Long-Term DoD Budget Plans** <sup>77</sup>  
(Budget Authority, Current Year \$ Billions)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY95-99</u>
<b>Personnel</b>	-1 8	-1 7	-6 1	-8 4	-10 7	-11 9	-40 6
<b>Operation &amp; Maintenance</b>	-1 8	+4 7	-0 1	+0 1	-2 7	-2 9	-2 8
<b>Procurement, RDT&amp;E</b>	-13 5	-18 5	-15 7	-16 3	-14 1	-14 7	-82 9
<b>Military Construction</b>	-0 1	+0 3	+4 3	+1 3	+0 8	+0 8	+7 4
<b>Family Housing</b>	-0 4	-0 7	-0 3	-0 2	-0 4	-0 2	-2 3
							-121 2

These resource priorities may have been appropriate in a period of downsizing when modernization programs were sustained by previously-approved funding. As they enter the eighth straight year of decreasing defense budgets, the services are concerned with the overall balance between current and future readiness, as Admiral Boorda declared to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

As you know, we've stressed readiness. And we have shortchanged modernization to do that. We have a particular problem in the out years, where bills are going to come due to buy things to keep the Navy ready in the future. So it's really future readiness we're talking about. <sup>78</sup>

*Army National Guard readiness-enhanced brigades.* Evidence suggests the current readiness of the Army's fifteen readiness-enhanced National Guard brigades remains below that envisioned by the BUR. During the Desert Shield buildup in 1990, President Bush authorized the mobilization of three Army Guard "roundout" combat brigades to join their designated active component units. Due to extensive training requirements, none of the brigades deployed to the Persian Gulf. As a result of the BUR, the Army eliminated the roundup and roundout brigades in favor of fifteen enhanced Army National Guard brigades that will, if required, reinforce active units deploying to a second MRC. These brigades are intended to be combat ready within 90 days after mobilization. In 1995 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated the readiness of seven of the enhanced brigades. The GAO determined none had met their peacetime training goals and probably could not meet their deployment goals. Estimates of the time required to achieve combat ready status ranged up to 154 days after unit mobilization. While the Army protested that the increased resources provided the

units are intended to prepare them to meet their deployment goals by 1998, the GAO maintained "prospects for the brigades to be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization are uncertain" <sup>79</sup>

*Support forces* In March 1992, the GAO reported to Congress that Army support forces "were critical to the success of Operations Desert Shield and Storm." <sup>80</sup> The GAO also concluded that while the Army deployed about eight of its eighteen divisions to Desert Storm, almost all of some types of nondivisional support units were required to support them. This reinforced Aspin's belief that a smaller force provided with adequate support could deal with simultaneous contingencies. While the BUR reduced the number of Army active divisions, there are still significant shortfalls in their support forces. In 1995 the GAO reported "the Army does not have sufficient nondivisional support units to support its current active combat force" for a two-MRC scenario. <sup>81</sup> The *1996 Strategic Assessment* published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies also concluded "the Army overall is considerably short of support forces (such as MPs, engineers, transportation units, etc.) to prosecute two MRCs. Estimates of the aggregate support deficiency range between 60,000 and 110,000 personnel." <sup>82</sup> Even the Army's latest *Total Army Analysis* study projected a shortfall of 60,000 support personnel <sup>83</sup>

As a partial solution to this shortfall, the GAO recommended the Army should consider reallocating some of its National Guard division assets to support the active combat force, based on their assessment that the actual combat role of the divisions was limited

The Guard's eight combat divisions and three separate combat units are not required to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, according to Army war planners and war planning documents that we reviewed. The Army's war planners at headquarters and at U S Forces Command stated that these forces are not needed during or after hostilities cease for one or more major regional conflicts. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not assigned the eight combat divisions or the three separate combat units for use in any major regional conflict currently envisioned in DoD planning scenarios <sup>84</sup>

The BUR maintained eight Army National Guard divisions to provide a rotational or replacement base for active forces engaged in prolonged operations, act as a strategic reserve and perform a variety of support missions for civilian authorities within the U.S. Preparing these divisions for actual combat would delay their deployment until well past the time they would be needed to augment the active force in the MRC scenarios the DoD uses to size its forces. Since adequate support is essential for fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MRCs with the smaller BUR force, the GAO's recommendation that the Army should consider converting a number of Guard combat units to meet the active component support shortfall may have merit.

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

*There is no doubt that we must continue to send our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines into harm's way. We must ensure, as we draw our forces down, that we don't end up with a force that is hollow or one that is unprepared for the dangers and challenges of the future.*<sup>85</sup> General Colin Powell

Since the end of the Cold War, two Administrations have conducted separate assessments of the nation's security strategy and military forces. While both reviews advocated strategies to shape the international environment by engaging globally and remaining prepared to fight two MRCs, the BUR recommended a force structure about 35 percent smaller than the Base Force and reduced funding for modernization significantly. Many believe, with some justification, that the smaller BUR force was actually the product of a top-down, fiscally-driven process that was intended to identify the least-cost instead of the most effective means to achieve U.S. security objectives.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, the DoD employed the same methodology for sizing and shaping forces for regional conflicts it had used for most of the Cold War, assuming this would provide the necessary capabilities for "lesser" missions also. As operational tempos remain the highest they have ever been in peacetime, emerging shortfalls are beginning to degrade the services' ability to respond to higher priority taskings. These shortfalls will continue to grow as fiscal priorities continue to limit critical enhancements.

modernization programs, and support capabilities that are intended to give a win-hold-win force the capability to win two MRCs nearly-simultaneously

#### An ends-means mismatch?

In the BUR final report, Secretary Aspin explained the nation must field sufficient capability to deter a second aggressor from taking advantage of U S. forces engaged in an MRC in another region, fight and win two MRCs nearly-simultaneously should deterrence fail, and hedge against larger-than-expected threats in the future.<sup>87</sup> Force enhancements and adequate support constitute the critical difference in capability for the BUR MRC force. Recent evidence suggests that while there has been progress in implementing the BUR's recommendations, fiscal constraints have had a significant impact on fielding the kind of capabilities the nation needs to fight and win two MRCs nearly-simultaneously. Despite shortfalls in modernization programs and support capabilities, few would challenge that the BUR force is a credible deterrent to a potential second aggressor. It should also be capable of fighting and winning two MRCs, however, it may not be able to meet the BUR nearly-simultaneous timeline. Furthermore, without additional near-term funding for recapitalization, modernization and support, future readiness will be affected and the nation may not have an adequate hedge against the potential emergence of a more robust threat or coalition of adversaries.

#### Beyond the Bottom-Up Review

There are a number of lessons to be learned from the second effort to fashion a security strategy and force structure for the post-Cold War era. The first step of the *next* review should be to develop a fully coordinated interagency national security strategy that identifies the environment, likely threats, prioritizes national interests, and integrates all of the instruments of national power. Building a military force without this foundation and interagency participation will not lead to a coherent end product. There may even be value in encouraging the development of competing

national security strategies, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "New Look" defense review did in the early 1950s. Second, DoD should not conduct the next review under the pressure of realizing a specific peace dividend. While broad fiscal guidance will always constrain the means available to force planners, the review should focus on maximizing capability for different budget levels instead of seeking the least-cost means to perform different missions. Discarding a traditional threat/scenario-based methodology in favor of capabilities-based planning may help achieve this end, move the DoD away from planning for the last war, and identify requirements for the full spectrum of operations. Depending on the national security strategy, MRCs may no longer be the most stressing case for sizing many of the nation's general purpose forces. Lesser contingencies that induce high peacetime operational tempos may have a greater impact on sizing the force than assumed previously. Resource priorities should also balance current readiness with force modernization. While the credibility of the nation's defense posture would be hurt by a return to the hollow force of the 1970s, maintaining current readiness at the expense of future readiness is a zero-sum game. Finally, the next review should evaluate the reserve component force mix to determine its contribution towards achieving national security objectives in peace and in war. Adjusting reserve forces will remain a politically sensitive issue, but it may be the best way in the near-term to reallocate resources to higher priority needs, including the Army's continuing support shortfall.

By allowing the services to downsize without becoming hollow, identifying key programs requiring continued investment, and cutting defense spending to a level that is more suitable for the post-Cold War era, the BUR has served the nation well. However, as the end of the 20th century approaches, it is apparent that a troubling mismatch between the means and ends of the *National Military Strategy* is beginning to emerge. As Secretary Perry recently announced, maintaining a quality force in the future may require the nation to "either cut forces and give up our military



strategy, or put in more resources”<sup>88</sup> If changes of this magnitude are necessary, they must not be done capriciously or incrementally. Moving beyond the BUR will require another comprehensive review of the capabilities the nation will need to protect its security interests in the 21st century, a review that builds on the lesson learned from the first two post-Cold War restructuring efforts

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, untitled news briefing (Washington, D C Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1 September 1993), 1

<sup>2</sup> Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994), 254-255

<sup>3</sup> Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s Defining A New Basis for U S Military Forces" (Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 20

<sup>4</sup> In September 1991, Aspin tasked two of his key analysts, Dr Clark Murdock and Joel Resnick, to develop a methodology for identifying capabilities needed for a post-Cold War security environment The Aspin white papers were largely the work of these two men, including force Options A-C Dr Murdock, author's interview, Washington, D C 15 March 1996

<sup>5</sup> Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era" (Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1992), 4

<sup>6</sup> Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era Four Illustrative Options" (Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992), 2-3 The paper also introduced a building block approach to determining forces required for typical missions In Aspin's lexicon, a "Desert Storm equivalent" described the capability required to fight a major regional contingency (MRC), a "Panama equivalent" as the force needed to conduct an operation similar to Just Cause and a "Provide Comfort equivalent" as a yardstick for humanitarian assistance missions A Desert Storm equivalent included "six heavy divisions, an air-transportable early-arriving light division, one Marine division on land and an excess of one brigade at sea, 24 Air Force fighter squadrons, 70 heavy bombers" and four carrier battlegroups This did not equal the forces that actually deployed to Desert Storm Aspin excluded a number of Air Force and Marine Corps fighter units that lacked precision attack capability and two carrier battlegroups the theater commander-in-chief had not requested Ibid , 15

<sup>7</sup> Ibid , 21

<sup>8</sup> Dr Murdock confirmed this was the underlying strategy for Aspin's force options

<sup>9</sup> National Defense Funding and the Fiscal Year 1993 Budget, hearing before the House Budget Committee, 102nd Cong , 2nd session, no 102-41, 25 February 1992 (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1992), 11-12 Option A would save \$231 billion, Option B \$187 billion, and Option D \$38 billion Aspin used the FY92 Bush budget request for FY93-97 as his baseline for calculating savings

<sup>10</sup> Chairman Les Aspin, Reuters transcript of an American Interests interview (Washington, D C 28 March 1992), 12

<sup>11</sup> Ibid , 15-16

<sup>12</sup> Chairman Les Aspin, "New Era Requires Re-Thinking U S Military Forces," news release (Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 1

<sup>13</sup> Ibid , 2

<sup>14</sup> Chairman Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s Defining a New Basis for U S Military Forces," briefing to the Atlantic Council of the United States (Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 6

<sup>15</sup> Aspin, "Four Illustrative Options," 20, Chart IV

<sup>16</sup> Aspin was not the only member of Congress who believed deeper cuts were feasible During the budget debate, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser called for doubling the Bush budget cuts while Senator Edward M Kennedy indicated \$210 billion in defense spending could be saved over the next seven years <sup>16</sup> Senators Bentsen Bradley, Roth, Gramm, and McCain also proposed deeper cuts that could pay for domestic initiatives In fact, a May 1992 Congressional Research Service report indicated a total of sixteen members of Congress had proposed alternative defense spending proposals, including Les Aspin

<sup>17</sup> Ibid , 322

<sup>18</sup> Reuters transcript report of the Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense, 7 January 1993, 68-69

<sup>19</sup> "Wisner Memo to Aspin on Bottom-Up Review," Inside the Air Force (Washington, D C 12 March 1993) 16

<sup>20</sup> Ibid , 16

<sup>21</sup> Ibid , 14

<sup>22</sup> Frank G Wisner and Admiral David E Jeremiah, U S Navy, "Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s" (Washington, D C Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 21 April 1993), 3

<sup>23</sup> Ibid , 24

- <sup>24</sup> Ibid , 5 In other words, it was time for a larger peace dividend
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid 28-29
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid , 30
- <sup>27</sup> Joint Staff J-8 Division, "Force for 2000," an unpublished briefing presented to Secretary Aspin (Washington, D C 8 May 1993) "AC" means active component; "RC" means reserve component, "CVBG" is the abbreviation for carrier battle group, and "MEB" is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade
- <sup>28</sup> A number of service representatives assigned to work BUR issues criticized the analysis underlying the assessment, including the assumption that coalition forces would be present to help U S forces during both MRCs
- <sup>29</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Remarks at the National Defense University Graduation," news release no 291-93 (Washington, D C Department of Defense, 16 June 1993), 2
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid , 3
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid , 3-4
- <sup>32</sup> Barton Gellman and John Lancaster, "U S May Drop 2-War Capability," The Washington Post, 17 June 1993, sec A, p 166 The "win-hold-win" option had actually leaked to the press before Aspin's NDU speech
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid , sec A, p 7
- <sup>34</sup> John Lancaster, "Aspin Opts for Winning Two Wars -- Not 1 1/2 -- at Once," The Washington Post, 25 June 1993, sec A, p 16
- <sup>35</sup> Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D C Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), 19
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid , 29-31
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid , 30
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid , 23
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid , 107 Candidate Clinton originally pledged to cut defense spending by about \$60 billion over the Bush plan for FY 1993-97 This was later changed to \$88 billion, and, finally, \$104 billion after the election Eric Schmitt, "Plan for 'New' Military Doesn't Meet Savings Goal," The New York Times, 15 September 1993, sec A, p 21
- <sup>40</sup> Lt Col Scott Dorff, U S Air Force, author's interview (Washington, D C 15 March 1996) Lt Col Dorff was a member of Secretary Ochmanek's staff during the BUR.
- <sup>41</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of defense for Public Affairs, "FY 1995 Defense Budget," news release 043-94 (Washington, D C Department of Defense 7 February 1994), 10
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid , 1
- <sup>43</sup> A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, July 1994), 1
- <sup>44</sup> National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1995), 1
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid , 111
- <sup>46</sup> Johan Benson, "Conversations with William Perry," Aerospace America (October 1994) 11 Cheney has stated that while the U S could still win a Desert Storm-size conflict in the Gulf, military forces could not deploy as rapidly, the war would last longer, and casualties would be greater
- <sup>47</sup> Defense budget estimates were compiled from The World Factbook 1995 (Washington, D C. Office of Public and Agency Information, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995)
- <sup>48</sup> Wisner, "Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s," Clearly, the world had changed since President Bush first announced the Base Force in 1990 As a result, Secretary Cheney and General Powell had already proposed additional force cuts and program terminations in 1991 and 1992 In fact, General Powell had developed a "Base Force II" by late 1992 but withheld it pending the outcome of the election Deputy Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Long-range Planning Dr Clark Murdock, interview by author (Washington, D C 15 March 1996) Dr Murdock was a key aide to Les Aspin in Congress and during his tenure as Secretary of Defense
- <sup>49</sup> John Isaacs, "Bottoms up," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (November 1993) 12
- <sup>50</sup> "FY 1995 Defense Budget," 7
- <sup>51</sup> OSD and the Joint Staff conducted their force analyses with an approximate budget in mind, often seeking the *minimum* required force in order to meet fiscal guidance The author participated in several such "budget drills" as the Air Force representative to the Joint Staff division responsible for bomber force issues during the BUR
- <sup>52</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "FY 1994 Defense Budget Begins New Era," news release xx-93 (Washington, D C Department of Defense, 27 March 1993), 1. 4

- <sup>53</sup> Paul K. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging," New Challenges for Defense Planning (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1994), 17-18
- <sup>54</sup> Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," Naval War College Review, vol. XLVII (Spring 1995), 122
- <sup>55</sup> Dr. Clark A. Murdock, "Mission Pull," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1994-95), 30
- <sup>56</sup> Davis, 44
- <sup>57</sup> National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid, 2
- <sup>59</sup> Unpublished draft transcript of a House National Security Committee Subcommittee on Military Procurement hearing (Washington, D.C.: House National Security Committee, 6 April 1995)
- <sup>60</sup> Nor will planned mobility force enhancements fully compensate for problems created by infrastructure limitations
- <sup>61</sup> Joint Staff J-3 Readiness Division, "How We Look At Readiness," unpublished briefing (Washington, D.C.: 19 September 1995)
- <sup>62</sup> Reserve Component Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1995), 22
- <sup>63</sup> Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 50-51
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid, 19
- <sup>65</sup> National Military Strategy, 18. Two of the sets will be deployed to Southwest Asia and one in South Korea
- <sup>66</sup> General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division, Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 31 January 1995), chapter 4, pg. 1
- <sup>67</sup> "Force for 2000," 8 May 1993
- <sup>68</sup> Senator John McCain, "Ready Tomorrow: Defending American Interests in the 21st Century," A white paper (Washington, D.C.: 19 March 1996), 17
- <sup>69</sup> Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 21
- <sup>70</sup> Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, The Bomber Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June 1992)
- <sup>71</sup> "Garbage In, Garbage Out: Unwarranted Assumptions Skew IDA Study's Findings, US Still Needs More Bombers" (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Security Policy, 17 May 1995), 1
- <sup>72</sup> Congressional Record, vol. 141, no. 138 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 7 September 1995), H8614
- <sup>73</sup> Unpublished draft transcript of a HNSC Subcommittee on Military Procurement hearing, 6 April 1995
- <sup>74</sup> "Cooking the Defense Books," The Washington Times, 21 March 1996, sec. A, p. 20. According to the *Times*, the first quote was from General Shalikashvili's annual *Chairman's Program Assessment* of the 1997 defense budget
- <sup>75</sup> "Military splits with Clinton on arms," The Washington Times, 14 March 1996, sec. A, p. 4
- <sup>76</sup> "Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1997," an unpublished draft hearing transcript (Washington, D.C.: House National Security Committee, 13 March 1996)
- <sup>77</sup> Stephen Daggett, "A Comparison of Clinton Administration and Bush Administration Long-Term Defense Budget Plans for FY1994-99," CRS Report for Congress 95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20 December 1994), 2. Mr. Daggett compared the Clinton budget against the budget President Bush would have submitted to Congress had he been reelected
- <sup>78</sup> "Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1997," 16
- <sup>79</sup> General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division, Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain, NSIAD report 95-91 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 June 1995), 2-7
- <sup>80</sup> General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division, Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces, NSIAD report 92-67 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 10 March 1992), 2
- <sup>81</sup> General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability, NSIAD report 95-80 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 March 1995), 4
- <sup>82</sup> Strategic Assessment 1996 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), 174
- <sup>83</sup> General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability, NSIAD report 95-80 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2 March 1995), 4

---

<sup>84</sup> Army National Guard Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly, GAO National Security and International Affairs Division report 96-63 (Washington, D C U S General Accounting Office, 14 March 1996), 3

<sup>85</sup> Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs, "Perspectives on the Military Downsizing," Current Messages for Senior Air Force Leaders, 93-01 (Washington, D C Department of the Air Force, July 1993), 1

<sup>86</sup> BUR analyses were also constrained by the need to issue meaningful fiscal guidance to the services in time for them to adjust their budgets

<sup>87</sup> Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 18-19

<sup>88</sup> David A Fulghum, "Two-War Strategy May Be Abandoned," Aviation Week and Space Technology (29 January 1996) 40

## ***BIBLIOGRAPHY***

- McCam, John, Senator. U S Congress "Ready Tomorrow Defending American Interests in the 21st Century" A white paper Washington, D C , 19 March 1996
- Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Washington, D C.. U S Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994
- Bush, George, President of the United States. "In Defense of Defense" Defense Issues, vol 5, no 31. Washington, D C Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1990.
- Powell, Colin, and Joseph E Persico My American Journey New York Random House. 1995
- Nunn, Sam, Senator, U S Congress "Defense Budget Blanks." Vital Speeches vol LVI no 13 (15 April 1990) 388
- National Security Strategy of the United States Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, August 1991
- Cheney, Richard B , Secretary of Defense Defense Strategy for the 1990s The Regional Defense Strategy Washington, D C Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1993
- Snider, Don M "Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decisionmaking, Post-Cold War, 1989-91" Professional Readings in Military Strategy no 8 Carlisle Barracks, PA U S Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1-59
- Daggett, Stephen "The FY1991 Budget Debate How Much for Defense?" CRS Issue Brief IB90061 Washington, D C Congressional Research Service, 17 December 1990
- Aspin, Les, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee "National Security in the 1990s Defining a New Basis for U S Military Forces" Briefing to the Atlantic Council of the United States Washington, D.C House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992
- \_\_\_\_\_ "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era." A white paper. Washington, D C. House Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1992
- \_\_\_\_\_ "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era Four Illustrative Options" A white paper Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992
- Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell Untitled news briefing Washington, D C Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1 September 1993
- Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense Report on the Bottom-Up Review Washington, D C. Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993

Bush, George, President of the United States Unpublished DoD transcript of a White House press conference Washington, D C 27 September 1991

Towell, Pat, and Andrew Taylor "Aspin, Cheney Spar Face-to-Face But Stay Far Apart on Budget " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50 (8 February 1992) 322-325

Dr Clark Murdock, Deputy Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Long-Range Planning Interview by author Washington, D C , 15 March 1996

National Defense Funding and the Fiscal Year 1993 Budget A hearing before the House Budget Committee, 102nd Cong , 2nd session, no 102-41, 25 February 1992 Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1992

Aspin, Les, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee "Defense Decisions for a One-Superpower World " Unpublished Reuters transcript of an American Interests television interview, Washington, D C , 28 March 1992

Aspin, Les, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "New Era Requires Re-Thinking U S Military Forces " News release Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992

Clinton, Bill "A New Covenant for American Security." Unpublished transcript of a speech delivered at Georgetown University. Little Rock, AK. Clinton National Campaign Headquarters, 12 December 1991

Clinton, Bill. "Remarks By Governor Bill Clinton, World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, CA " Speech transcript Little Rock, AK Clinton National Campaign Headquarters, 13 August 1992

Nominations Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, First Session, 103D Congress A hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 103d Cong , 1st session, no 103-414, 7 January 1993 (Washington, D C U S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 1-184

"Wisner Memo to Aspin on Bottom-Up Review " Inside the Air Force (12 March 1993) 13-17

Wisner, Frank G , and David E Jeremiah, Admiral, U S Navy "Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s." Unpublished draft national security strategy Washington, D C Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 21 April 1993

Joint Staff J-8 Division. "Force for 2000 " An unpublished briefing Washington, D C , 8 May 1993

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs "Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Remarks at the National Defense University Graduation " OSD news release no 291-93 Washington, D C.. Department of Defense, 16 June 1993

Gellman, Barton, and John Lancaster "U S May Drop 2-War Capability " The Washington Post, 17 June 1993, sec A, p 1-2, 17.

Lancaster John "Aspin Opts for Winning Two Wars -- Not 1 1/2 -- at Once " The Washington Post, 25 June 1993, sec A, p 16

Eric Schmitt. "Plan for 'New' Military Doesn't Meet Savings Goal," The New York Times 15 September 1993, sec A, p 21

Dorff, Scott, Lt Col, U.S. Air Force Interview by author Washington, D C , 15 March 1996

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs "FY 1995 Defense Budget." News release 043-94 Washington, D C. Department of Defense, 7 February 1994

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, July 1994

National Military Strategy of the United States of America Washington, D C U.S Government Printing Office, 1995

Benson. Johan "Conversations with William Perry " Aerospace America (October 1994) 11-13

The World Factbook 1995. Washington, D C Office of Public and Agency Information, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995

Isaacs. John "Bottoms up " The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (November 1993) 12-13

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. "FY 1994 Defense Budget Begins New Era " News release xx-93. Washington, D C , Department of Defense, 27 March 1993

Davis, Paul K "Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging " New Challenges for Defense Planning Santa Monica, California RAND Corporation. 1994, 15-57

Bartlett, Henry C , G Paul Holman, and Timothy E. Somes "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning" Naval War College Review vol. XLVII (Spring 1995) 114-126

Murdock, Clark A , Dr "Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning " Joint Force Quarterly 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95) 29-35

Hearing of the House National Security Committee Subcommittee on Military Procurement An unpublished draft transcript. Washington, D C House National Security Committee, 6 April 1995

Joint Staff J-3 Readiness Division "How We Look At Readiness " An unpublished briefing Washington, D C , 19 September 1995

Reserve Component Programs Washington, D C · Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1995

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force The Bomber Roadmap A white paper Washington, D C Department of the Air Force, June 1992

The Center for Security Policy "Garbage In, Garbage Out· Unwarranted Assumptions Skew I D A Study's Findings; U S Still Needs More Bombers " News release Washington, D C , 17 May 1995



Congressional Record, vol 141, no 138 Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 7 September 1995

"Cooking the Defense Books " The Washington Times 21 March 1996, sec A, p 20

"Military splits with Clinton on arms " The Washington Times 14 March 1996. sec A, p 4

"Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1997 " Unpublished draft transcript of hearing of the House National Security Committee Washington, D C House National Security Committee, 13 March 1996

Daggett, Stephen "A Comparison of Clinton Administration and Bush Administration Long-Term Defense Budget Plans for FY1994-99 " CRS report for Congress 95-20 Washington, D C. Congressional Research Service, 20 December 1994

General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division Army National Guard Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain NSIAD report 95-91 Washington, D.C : General Accounting Office, 2 June 1995

General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division Operation Desert Storm Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces NSIAD report 92-67 Washington, D C. General Accounting Office, 10 March 1992

General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division Force Structure Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability NSIAD report 95-80 Washington, D C : General Accounting Office, 2 March 1995

Strategic Assessment 1996 Washington, D C National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996

General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division Force Structure Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability NSIAD report 95-80 Washington, D C. General Accounting Office, 2 March 1995

General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division Army National Guard Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly NSIAD report 96-63 Washington, D.C General Accounting Office, 14 March 1996

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Public Affairs, "Perspectives on the Military Downsizing " Current Messages for Senior Air Force Leaders 93-01 Washington, D C Department of the Air Force, July 1993

Fulghum, David A "Two-War Strategy May Be Abandoned " Aviation Week and Space Technology (29 January 1996): 90.

General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division Bottom-Up Review Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions NSIAD report 95-56 Washington, D C General Accounting Office, 31 January 1995

## **SUPPLEMENTAL ATTACHMENTS**

### **Attachment 1**

#### **Building A Base Force for the Post-Cold War Era**

A brief monograph on the Bush Administration post-Cold War defense review that produced the Base Force

### **Attachment 2**

#### **Supplemental tables and figures**

Table 1 Aspin's Changing Security Environment

Figure 1 Aspin's Four Force Options

Table 3 Military Capabilities Required to Secure U S Interests

Table 5 BUR Recommended Force Structure for 1999

Table 6 Bush Baseline Versus Clinton Future Years Defense Program

Figure 2: Achieving National Military Objectives

Figure 3 U S Air Force Personnel Deployed Overseas

Table 8: Selected Army National Guard and Reserve Support Units

## *ATTACHMENT 1*

### **BUILDING A BASE FORCE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

*"We are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can and must be different."*  
*President George Bush, 2 August 1990<sup>1</sup>*

On 4 November 1990, slightly over a month after assuming the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell began brainstorming about the potential course of world events over the next five years. According to his memoirs, General Powell believed a neutral Eastern Europe, a unified Germany, and a less-threatening Soviet Union were all plausible futures the DoD should consider as it developed the next Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). His timing was impeccable. Within a week, the Berlin Wall had fallen and General Powell had presented his strategic vision to Secretary of Defense Cheney and President Bush. The President directed the Chairman to "proceed with caution," initiating a review that would produce the first U.S. defense strategy for a post-Cold War world.<sup>2</sup> At the beginning of the last decade of the 20th Century, the Bush Administration was struggling with record budget deficits, a disintegrating Soviet empire, and the resulting Congressional pressure for significant defense reductions. Two days after Powell's briefing to the President, Secretary Cheney directed the services to plan for a \$176 billion budget cut over the next three years. While many in Congress were pleased the Administration had acknowledged the opportunity to realize a "peace dividend," others pointed out the proposed cuts were not based on a coherent strategy. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, voiced a concern that would be repeated over the next two years.

---

<sup>1</sup> President George Bush, "In Defense of Defense," *Defense Issues*, vol. 5, no. 31 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1990), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Colin Powell, and Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 440. Towards the end of his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe had also tasked the Joint Staff to develop options for a smaller force.

In general, Secretary Cheney and General Powell have begun the process of restructuring our military establishment in response to the fiscal threat, but not yet in response to the changes in military threat the Congress will have to act if the Defense Department does not<sup>3</sup>

The DoD did act Over the next eight months, OSD, the Joint Staff and the services refined General Powell's ideas, developing what became the "Base Force" for a new, regionally-oriented national security strategy One of the more innovative aspects of General Powell's strategic vision was the concept of moving from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" force sized to perform broad missions This force would be capable of deterring and defending against uncertain threats to U.S. security interests in critical regions.<sup>4</sup> According to General Powell, the Base Force consisted of four basic packages a force capable of fighting a major conventional conflict across the Atlantic, another to fight a similar war across the Pacific, one that could deploy from the U S to a lesser contingency such as Operation Just Cause, and a smaller but credible force for nuclear deterrence.<sup>5</sup> President Bush approved the Base Force on 1 August 1990, with the building blocks proposed by General Powell as its strategic heart On 2 August 1990, one day before the start of what became America's first post-Cold War conflict, President Bush unveiled the new national security strategy in a speech to the Aspen Institute<sup>6</sup>

#### A new security paradigm

The strategy announced by President Bush discarded a forty-year focus on containing Communism in favor of meeting regional challenges to U.S national interests Officially published in August 1991, the four pillars of the *National Security Strategy of the United States* were strategic deterrence and defense, maintaining a credible forward presence, responding to regional crises, and

---

<sup>3</sup> Senator Sam Nunn, "Defense Budget Blanks," Vital Speeches, vol LVI, no 13(15 April 1990) 385

<sup>4</sup> Robert P Haffa, Jr, "A 'New Look' At the Bottom-Up Review Planning U S General Purpose Forces For A New Century," Strategic Review (Winter 1996) 22

<sup>5</sup> Powell, 452, 458

<sup>6</sup> A concurrent OSD review led by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz produced similar strategy and force recommendations

preserving the ability to reconstitute new forces as a hedge against uncertainty<sup>7</sup> The Base Force to meet the requirements of the strategy would result in a 25 percent active component force reduction over the next five years. The Administration's overall intent was to "build down" to meet the new security imperatives, not just preserve a smaller version of a Cold War force. Robust research and development would continue in order to gain the high-tech capabilities the nation would need for the next century. Readiness and force structure received top priority for resources, followed by force sustainability, and science and technology.<sup>8</sup>

### Congressional reaction

While the Base Force would lead to a 25 percent force reduction, it did not translate into an equivalent cut in the defense budget. The budget presented to Congress by Secretary Cheney assumed force modernization would continue, resulting in a 10 percent decrease in defense spending by FY95 after adjusting for inflation<sup>9</sup> This was less than half the savings desired by the House and Senate Budget Committees. Although both the Administration and Congress were seeking to reduce the budget deficit, the Administration wanted to do so without gutting defense or resorting to new taxes, while Congress intended to minimize cuts in domestic spending. Within a few days, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin countered Cheney's proposal by publicizing a Congressional Budget Office study illustrating how a 25 percent force cut could translate into a 18-27 percent budget reduction over five years<sup>10</sup> However, given the still-uncertain course of events in

---

<sup>7</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D C. U S Government Printing Office, August 1991), 25-31

<sup>8</sup> The final Bush Administration regional security strategy, published in January 1993, added systems acquisition infrastructure, and overhead to the resource priority list Secretary of Defense Richard B Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s The Regional Defense Strategy (Washington, D C Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1993)

<sup>9</sup> Don M Snider. "Strategy, Forces and Budgets Dominant Influences in Executive Decisionmaking, Post-Cold War, 1989-91," Professional Readings in Military Strategy no 8 (Carlisle Barracks, PA U S Army War College Strategic Studies Institute), 29

<sup>10</sup> Stephen Daggett, "The FY1991 Budget Debate How Much for Defense?" CRS Issue Brief IB90061 (Washington, D C Congressional Research Service, 17 December 1990), CRS-1

the Soviet Union, Congress was unwilling to insist on significantly deeper cuts. After considerable bargaining, the President and Congress compromised at \$288 billion in budget authority for FY91 versus \$307 billion originally requested in January 1990, with \$291.6 billion for FY92 and \$291.8 billion for FY93. More importantly, Congress agreed not to tap the defense budget to fund discretionary domestic programs for the next three years. While debate over the new strategy and force structure continued, the budget agreement, combined with the success of Desert Storm, helped forestall initiatives for reducing defense spending until the eve of the next Presidential election year.

Two imperatives emerged from the 1990 defense debate: the need to develop a national security strategy and force structure that recognized the changing environment and cut defense spending. These imperatives were also evident during the FY93-97 budget cycle. The defense budget submitted to Congress on 29 January 1992 proposed \$280.9 billion in spending authority for FY93. This \$11 billion cut reflected the President's decision to curtail strategic force modernization programs in response to the breakup of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>11</sup> Over the FYDP, the Administration planned to save about \$50 billion by buying fewer B-2s, ending Seawolf submarine production, and terminating the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM, mobile small ICBM, and Short Range Attack Missile-II programs.<sup>12</sup> Despite the Administration's proposal, Aspin challenged Secretary Cheney at a 6 February meeting of the House Armed Services Committee, declaring "the base force budget you've submitted looks to me very much like a one-revolution budget in a two-revolution world," setting the stage for Aspin's alternative force proposals.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> President George Bush, from a DoD transcript of a White House press conference, 27 September 1991

<sup>12</sup> This was a decline of about 4.6 percent from the FY92 baseline budget, after adjusting for inflation

<sup>13</sup> Pat Towell and Andrew Taylor, "Aspin, Cheney Spar Face-to-Face But Stay Far Apart on Budget," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50 (Washington, D.C. 8 February 1992) 322

## ***ATTACHMENT 2***

**Table 1: Aspin's Changing Security Environment**


Chairman Aspin's concept of the post-Cold War security environment, delivered in a presentation to the Atlantic Council on 6 January 1992 <sup>1</sup>

<b><u>Old World</u></b>	<b><u>New World</u></b>
<b><i>AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS</i></b>	
Soviet Military Power	Spread of Nuclear Weapons
	Terrorism
	Regional Thugs
	Drug Traffickers
Deliberate Soviet Attack	Instability in the Former Soviet Republics
Economic Power Assumed	Japanese economic power
High Defense Budgets	Declining Defense Budgets
Global Security Concerns Paramount	Domestic Security Concerns Paramount
<b><i>THE THREAT</i></b>	
Single (Soviet)	Diverse
Survival at Stake	Interests/Americans at Stake
Known	Unknown
Deterrable	Non-deterrable
Strategic Use of Nukes	Terroristic use of Nukes
Overt	Covert
Europe-Centered	Regional, Ill-Defined
High Risk of Escalation	Little risk of Escalation
<b><i>MILITARY FORCES</i></b>	
Attrition Warfare	Decisive Attacks on Key Nodes
War by Proxy	Direct Involvement
High Tech Dominant	High-Medium-Low Tech Mix
Forward Deployed	Power Projection
Forward Based	U S -Based
Host-Nation Support	Self Reliant

<sup>1</sup> Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin. "National Security in the 1990s Defining A New Basis for U S Military Forces" (Washington, D C House Armed Services Committee, 6 January 1992), 21

**Figure 1: Aspin's Four Force Options**

Chairman Aspin's four force alternatives to the Base Force, presented to the House Budget Committee on 25 February 1992. Aspin later advocated Congress should favor Option C <sup>2</sup>



<sup>2</sup> Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options" (Washington D C: House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992), Chart II



**Table 3: Military Capabilities Required to Secure U.S. Interests**

Post-Cold War dangers, strategies, and military capabilities postulated by OSD during the early stages of the Bottom-Up Review <sup>3</sup>

<u><b>Dangers</b></u>	<u><b>Strategies/Capabilities</b></u>
<b>Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</b>	<b>Deterrence, Defense and Conventional Counterforce</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selective retaliation</li> <li>• Ballistic missile defense</li> <li>• Air defense</li> <li>• Disarming attacks</li> </ul>
<b>Residual Russian Nuclear Arsenal</b>	<b>Deterrence</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survivable forces</li> <li>• Selective and large-scale nuclear retaliation</li> </ul>
<b>Regional Aggression</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Large-scale aggression</li> <li>- State sponsored terrorism</li> </ul>	<b>Deter/defeat regional aggressors</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely power projection capabilities</li> <li>• Overseas presence, combined training</li> <li>• Punitive attacks</li> <li>• Counter-terrorist operations</li> </ul>
<b>Internal instability, conflict</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ethnic, religious, other conflict</li> <li>- Subversion, lawlessness vs friendly governments</li> </ul>	<b>Prevention/resolution of internal conflicts</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intervention, Peace enforcement</li> <li>• Peacekeeping</li> <li>• "Nation assistance"</li> <li>• Non-combat evacuation</li> <li>• Overseas presence</li> <li>• Humanitarian operations</li> <li>• Disaster relief and recovery</li> </ul>
<b>Reversal of reform in FSU</b>	<b>Long-term Preparedness</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobilization base</li> <li>• Capabilities to rebuild forces</li> </ul>
<b>Deterioration of economic ties</b>	<b>Security partnerships</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overseas presence</li> <li>• Capabilities to underwrite alliance commitments</li> </ul>

<sup>3</sup> Frank G. Wisner and Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, "Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s" (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 21 April 1993), 28-29

**Table 5: BUR Recommended Force Structure for 1999<sup>4</sup>**

<b>Army</b>	10 divisions (active) 5+ divisions (reserve)
<b>Navy</b>	11 aircraft carriers (active) 1 aircraft carrier (reserve/training) 45-55 attack submarines 346 ships
<b>Air Force</b>	13 fighter wings (active) 7 fighter wings Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)
<b>Marine Corps</b>	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 personnel (active end-strength) 42,000 personnel (reserve end-strength)
<b>Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)</b>	18 ballistic missile submarines Up to 94 B-52H bombers 20 B-2 bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)

**Table 6: Bush Baseline Versus Clinton Future Years Defense Program**  
(Billions of Dollars in Budget Authority)

Secretary Aspin estimated the BUR's recommendations would save about \$91 billion over the 1995-99 FYDP. Since the President's target was to cut \$104 billion from the Bush baseline budget, Aspin mandated an additional \$13 billion cut would be spread across the first four years of the FYDP <sup>5</sup>


	<u>FY95</u>	<u>FY96</u>	<u>FY97</u>	<u>FY98</u>	<u>FY99</u>	<u>FY95-99</u>
<b>Baseline</b>	257	261	264	270	273	1,325
<b>Clinton Budget</b>	<u>249</u>	<u>242</u>	<u>236</u>	<u>244</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>1,221</u>
<b>Reduction</b>	8	19	28	26	23	104

<sup>4</sup> Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D C Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), 19

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 107-108 These figures do not include Department of Energy defense-related funding


**Figure 2: Achieving National Military Objectives**

Military tasks and objectives outlined in the *1995 National Military Strategy of the United States of America* <sup>6</sup>



**Figure 3: U.S. Air Force Personnel Deployed Overseas<sup>7</sup>**  
(exercises and operational commitments)

This graph excludes forces deployed during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Army and the Navy have reported similar increases in their peacetime deployment rates.



<sup>6</sup> *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D C U S Government Printing Office, 1995), 4

<sup>7</sup> Data obtained from a briefing prepared by the author for the former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force General Merrill A. McPeak, updated 16 March 1996

**Table 8: Selected Army National Guard and Reserve Support Units<sup>8</sup>**

The Bottom-Up Review maintained a large percentage of the Army's support units in the reserve component, assuming they would mobilize to support active components in time of war. This may impact the Army's ability to support multiple simultaneous taskings in peacetime

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Number Units</u>		<u>Combined Percent</u>
	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Total Army</u>
Water Supply Battalions	2	3	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	37	97
Petroleum Support Battalions	6	6	86
Medical Brigades	3	10	86
Hospitals	24	47	85
Medical Groups	3	9	71
Motor Battalions	6	11	77
Maintenance Battalions	11	5	73
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	14	15	76
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	39	10	63
Psychological Operations Units	0	33	75
Military Police Battalions	12	19	72
Military Police Brigades	3	2	56

<sup>8</sup> Reserve Component Programs (Washington, D C.. Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1995), 13